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DISJUNCTIVE CONSTELLATIONS:  




The planetary scale of climate change challenges forms of conjunctural analyses that are 
based around the scale of national politics and culture. Global warming insists on 
planetary dimensions and invites us to treat humankind as a species that has developed a 
taste for fossil fuels. Critical Cultural Studies, and the human sciences more generally, 
seem founded on the principle that culture and society has historically worked to 
differentiate humans, and that the task of a critical practice is to investigate this process 
within and across specific geographical locales. How do we reconcile what seems to be 
an unreconcilable difference between Cultural Studies and climate change? Below I 
argue that alongside the necessary work of conjunctural analysis we should remember 
that the critical human sciences have other capacities that are more suited to negotiating 
the monstrous diversity of scales that global warming and the micro cultures of the 
everyday articulate. Alongside conjunctural analysis I argue for the relevance of an 
approach that would posit ‘disjunctive constellations’ as objects for attention. While it 
might seem counter-intuitive, the disjunctive constellations I have in mind are at once 
more modest and (potentially) more expansive than a conjuncture. In my understanding, 
disjunctive constellations are not in opposition to conjunctures; they may well be the 
critical kernel at the heart of a conjunctural sensitivity.    
 




This essay has one overriding concern: how might cultural enquiry sensitize itself to the 
historical condition of the Anthropocene, and how might this alter the practice of a field 
such as Cultural Studies? To put the question slightly differently: how might the 
practice of conjunctural analysis, which many commentators take to be the defining 
mode of attention for Cultural Studies, accommodate the wild temporal dissonance 
signalled by the Anthropocene? This is hardly a new concern and might be a central 
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question framing intellectual fields such as the environmental humanities and the energy 
humanities. Indeed, Imre Szeman, one of the key exponents of the energy humanities, 
figures temporal dissonance in the following way:  
 
We could never have been modern except for our access to coal, oil, and gas, 
which provide us with an unprecedented amount of cheap energy. Everything we 
have come to associate with modernity – from its characteristic speed and 
contraction of space, to its technologies and infrastructures – is possible only as 
a result of our access to these remnants of ancient life.1 
 
It is this wild orchestration, where the long history of the modern (the cultural scene of 
the Anthropocene) is thoroughly dependent on the pre-human life of fossil fuels, that 
holds out an invitation to Cultural Studies, while asking it to expand its historical 
imagination.  
Thirty or so years ago, during the period of Cultural Studies’ global expansion 
within higher education, the current situation of climate crisis might have resulted in a 
plethora of edited collections, anthologies and monographs announcing a distinct 
Cultural Studies approach to the issue. That this doesn’t appear to be happening today 
might tell us something about the institutional contraction of Cultural Studies (and its 
disciplinary osmosis and absorption by more traditionally secure disciplines), but it 
might also tell us something about the imaginative affordances of the way Cultural 
Studies has often been practiced. It is of course not true that Cultural Studies has 
remained inactive in facing the climate crisis. In a special issue of the journal Cultural 
Studies (now over a quarter of a century old) Jody Berland and Jennifer Daryl Slack 
argue that while ‘Cultural Studies meets the environment rather well prepared to clarify 
the complexities of the interrelationship of the act of making the subject of the 
environment and of making it an important subject’ it is ‘rather less prepared to handle 
the “problem” of the “physical substance”’ of the environment.2 Their journal issue 
goes on to attend to that physical substance (of earth, water, weather), while not losing 
 
1 Imre Szeman, ‘Energy, climate and the classroom: A letter’, in Teaching Climate Change in the 
Humanities, edited by Stephen Siperstein, Shane Hall, and Stephanie LeMenager, Routledge, London, 
2017, p46. 
 





sight of way that representation is also a physical presence that has significant affects 
and effects and at times planetary consequences.  
While this is not the place to offer an exhaustive account of the range of Cultural 
Studies’ engagements with environmentalism and global warming, it might be the case 
that the sort of critical reflexes that Cultural Studies developed in the 1990s were not 
particularly amenable to an approach to environmental concerns.3 In that same issue of 
Cultural Studies McKenzie Wark reminds us of the huge influence exerted by Fredric 
Jameson’s Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, which starkly 
announced on its first page that ‘Postmodernism is what you have when the 
modernization process is complete and nature is gone for good’.4 Cultural Studies’ 
preoccupation with the contemporary, often means that its historical scale is determined 
by quite recent human history. This is the scale of the conjuncture, and its political 
expediencies. To consider the deep time of the Anthropocene and its antecedents, might 
require temporarily foregoing the political rationality of conjunctures for the more 
unmanageable and oceanic frame of a disjuncture. It is not, of course, a question of 
either/or, but of investigating what could happen when the historical scale of Cultural 
Studies is exploded.  
TIME SIGNATURES AND CONJUNCTURES 
 
The idea of the conjunctural is one that the human sciences have made various attempts 
to configure. For Ernst Bloch, trying to understand the moment when modernity vomits-
up something as atavistic and sadistic as National Socialism alongside endless 
technological modernizing, required an understanding that people are simultaneously 
living different historical trajectories. He called this ‘non-synchronous simultaneity’. 
For Bloch; ‘Not all people exist in the same Now. They do so only externally, by virtue 
of the fact that they may all be seen today. But that does not mean that they are living at 
the same time with others.’5 A historical moment might always involve the immediately 
 
3 A full literature review of Cultural Studies engagement with environmentalism would have to reserve a 
central place for Alexander Wilson’s The Culture of Nature: North American Landscape from Disney to 
the Exxon Valdez, Blackwell, Oxford, 1992. Wilson, who died in 1993 from AIDS-related illnesses, was a 
cultural studies writer, a landscape architect and an activist. 
 
4 McKenzie Wark, ‘Third Nature’, Cultural Studies, vol. 8, no. 1, 1994, p121. Fredric Jameson, 
Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Verso, London, 1991. 
 
5 Ernst Bloch, ‘Nonsynchronism and the Obligation to Its Dialectics’ (1932), translated by Mark Ritter, 
New German Critique, no. 11, Spring, 1977, p22. 
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simultaneous, but this doesn’t mean that this a synchronised moment. A seemingly 
more systematic treatment of a non-synchronous simultaneity was offered by Louis 
Althusser in an important chapter in Reading Capital, subtitled ‘Outline of a Concept of 
Historical Time’. Althusser imagines a social totality consisting of ‘different structured 
levels’, which all exhibit a ‘relative autonomy’ to each other yet become part of the 
‘unity of a conjuncture’ because the economic structure is determining ‘in the last 
instance’.6 Too many bytes have been expended debating economic determinism to 
tempt me to add to that cache here. Of more interest to me is Althusser’s ability to 
imagine a heterogenous slice of historical time where each level moves at its ‘own’ 
speed and rhythm:  
 
[…] we have to assign to each [level] a peculiar time, relatively autonomous and 
hence relatively independent, even in its dependence, of the ‘times’ of other 
levels. We can and must say: for each mode of production there is a peculiar 
time and history, punctuated in a specific way by the development of productive 
forces; the relations of production have their peculiar time and history, 
punctuated in a specific way; the political superstructure has its own history…; 
philosophy has its own time and history…; aesthetic productions have their own 
time and history…; scientific formations have their own time and history, etc. 
Each of these peculiar histories is punctuated with peculiar rhythms and can only 
be known on condition that we have defined the concept of the specificity of its 
historical temporality and its punctuations (continuous development, 
revolutions, breaks, etc.).7 
 
We don’t need to agree with Althusser’s allocation of disciplinary levels (politics, 
philosophy, science, art, economics) to catch the drift of his historical rhythmicity; a 
multitude of peculiar rhythms, orchestrated at various times and rates by continuity, by 
breaks, by local punctuations. And while he is at pains to distance himself from the 
Annales School of historians, he is clearly indebted to their trenchant refusal of history 
 
 
6 Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital, translated by Ben Brewster, Verso, London, 
1979, p99. 
 




as a linear series of events (one damn thing after another) set against unfolding, 
homogenous time.  
It was Fernand Braudel (name-checked in Althusser’s chapter) who, in the 
preface to his monumental study of the Mediterranean that he first published in 1949, 
offered one of the most vivid invocations of historical time as a multiplicity of 
interlacing tempos and durations. In his preface he writes about how the problematic of 
taking a complex geographical site as an object of history led him to scour materials 
provided by ‘anthropologists, geographers, botanists, geologists, technologists’.8 
Braudel was writing history at a time when the usual object of history was political 
diplomacy, and so by taking the environmental conditions of place seriously he brought 
what he thought of as a geological sense of time to a discipline usually primed for the 
day to day negotiations of human agents (a week is a long time in politics, as the saying 
goes). If the environment has a history it doesn’t have the same sort of history as 
diplomacy; they have different beats. It is here that Braudel describes three different 
rates of historical change. The slowest is the famous longue durée: ‘a history whose 
passage is almost imperceptible, that of man in his relationship to the environment, a 
history in which all change is slow, a history of constant repetition, ever-recurring 
cycles’. This is a history that is fashioned out of rocks and earth, trees and crops, rain 
and ice. It is fashioned out of cycles of weather and slowly changing agricultural 
practices. Alongside this, or on top of this is ‘the slow but perceptible rhythms’ of social 
history ‘of groups and groupings.’ These are ‘swelling currents’ of changes that can be 
registered over a lifetime or a generation: changes in social attitudes and institutions; in 
politics and economics. Quickest is ‘History on the scale not of man, but of individual 
men – that is the history of events: surface disturbances, crests of foam that the tides of 
history carry on their strong backs. A history of brief, rapid, nervous fluctuations, by 
definition ultra-sensitive; the least tremor sets all its antennae quivering.’9 For Braudel, 
historical attention has been overly caught by these surface disturbances (discoveries, 
inventions, diplomacy, politics) and needs to take heed of much slower recalibrations of 
human life and planetary history. As might seem fitting for a book named after a sea, 
Braudel’s historical imagination is based on a series of aquatic analogies; his is a tidal 
 
8 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II: Volume I, 
translated by Siân Reynolds, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1995, p18. 
 




world. He imagines choppy seas and underlying currents, cresting waves and slow, 
fathomless drift. In musical terms it is an orchestration of epochal drones, lilting 
melodies, and frenetic syncopations. To stop it sounding simply cacophonous the 
historian needs a way of listening that can hear the rough music of our poly-temporal 
existence. 
There is then a relatively long history to trying to grasp the simultaneous 
temporal complexity of a conjuncture, of the conjunctural. Indeed, the term names that 
quest. But I mention these writers now not simply to pay due diligence to intellectual 
history, but because these writers don’t simply address a problem and offer a solution, 
their writings also embody a set of problems. And while these problems are not new, 
they are newly urgent. With Bloch and Althusser, the problem is familiar: the logic of 
lags and advances, of primitives and progressives, is an issue of teleology, where 
temporal characteristics and values are secured through a tacit agreement of the path of 
history towards an imagined future, even if that future is a utopian hope. With Althusser 
there is also the problem of complexity: not as a knotted understanding that knowledge 
can only ever be partial, but as a will-to-totality whereby the assemblage of the present 
can be known through the (potentially infinite) labour of mapping and connecting. 
Taking his cue from the structuralism he was associated with it is the privileging of the 
synchronic over the diachronic. For Althusser, to understand the conjunctural meant 
undertaking a synchronic analysis of the social totality, seen as endlessly complex and 
fashioned (as in a geological slice) of different temporal bands (politics, art, and on and 
on). Here any one moment is a vast network of interlacing strands held together by the 
heuristic of the ‘last instance’. It is hard to imagine the sort of systematised thinking that 
would be able to map this in its entirety. Perhaps this is the dream of complexity that 
drives the digital humanities, or the one that underpins the current drive for 
interdisciplinarity (often valued today as funded collaborations between settled 
disciplines)? For the strain of Cultural Studies that I’m most partial to, the idea of 
complexity has always been more modest, more critical, more interruptive.  
And lastly there is Braudel’s sense of different modes of history, running to their 
own characteristic time signatures: the slow, glacial labours of the environment and the 
tempered rhythms of the seasons, repeated tirelessly over centuries; the relatively faster 
alterations of social history that still take decades to accomplish; and hurtling around 
‘on top’, the frenetic, often furious, altercations that we still call ‘the news’. Today such 
an understanding of temporal consistency is immediately put in peril by the latest 
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‘freak’ weather event. Today glaciers aren’t an emblem of unswerving constancy but 
are being lost to global warming. Today it is the environment, the climate, that is 
increasingly behaving with the unpredictability and frothing nervousness of event-time. 
And how do we understand the accumulated accomplishments of social-time when 
social programmes that have taken decades to build can be recklessly abandoned, 
seemingly at the stroke of a pen? And how are we to understand the actions of specific 
men and women, when some of their actions take generations to unfold? How do we 
understand historical events, that Rob Nixon characterises with the oxymoron ‘slow 
violence’?10 How do we register the temporality of an ‘event’ such as the Union Carbide 
methyl isocyanate gas leak in Bhopal? The night of 2-3 December 1984 names the date 
of the leak, but it was already ‘anticipated’ by maintenance practices that preceded that 
night and by decisions to produce pesticides going back decades, and its violence is still 
being felt today, thirty-five years later.  
How do we plot the conjunctural under these circumstances? And is ‘plotting’ 
what we need to do? Does the conjunctural, as a synchronic moment of simultaneity, 
help or hinder our ability to bare witness to slow violence, to the political dynamics of 
environmental histories that bear the stigmata of colonial histories? How do we register 
the conjunctures of sudden eruptions of weather, of toxic seepage and build-up 
(chemical toxicities, gendered toxicities, racialised toxicities), alongside the many 
modernities and their freedoms that have been built on a carbon economy enacted as the 
depletion of planetary time stored as coal, gas, and oil? The conjunctural as imagined by 
Althusser required, at the very least, a momentary settled distribution of time parcelled-
out into relatively discrete sites. Such a distribution was probably always an abstraction, 
an abstraction which our current climate history is revealing as increasingly untenable. 
For Andreas Malm: 
 
At its core, then, climate change is a messy mix-up of time scales. The 
fundamental variables of the process – the nature of fossil fuels, the economies 
based on them, the societies addicted to them, the consequences of their 
combustion – operate over seemingly unrelated temporal spaces, all refracted in 
the moving, elusive present of a warming world; in an elevated sense of the 
 





term, every conjuncture now combines relics and arrows, loops and 
postponements that stretch from the deepest past to the most distant future, via a 
now that is non-contemporaneous with itself. Ours is, if anything, an epoch of 
diachronicity.11   
 
The time of a tree, which is a result of recent photosynthesis, is not the time of a piece 
of coal, which is the result of archaic photosynthesis. Seen from the perspective of the 
environment, time isn’t something that is most productively related to human scale: if 
carbon emissions ended tomorrow the seas would continue heating up for hundreds of 




Braudel was right in wanting to expand our historical consciousness of time, but 
perhaps the longue durée he imagined wasn’t quite long enough. According to the 
geologist Marcia Bjornerud, we need a timefulness that can accommodate geological, 
planetary history: a history that can accommodate rocks, plate tectonics, oil and coal, 
and mass extinctions.  Bjornerud undertook her doctoral research in the mid-1980s, in 
the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard where ‘the Ice Age had not yet loosened its 
grip’, and where there was ‘no official time’.12 What would it be like to expand our 
timefulness while thinking conjuncturally? Would we notice that the emergence of a 
national clock time, in England, coincided with the exponential expansion of the 
railways in the 1840s?13 And that this manifestation of unified, homogenous time 
required the burning of, ancient fossilised carbons. Or put slightly differently; that a 
quickly expanding human modernity was fuelled, not by the pre-modern, but by the pre-
human? When Bjornerud was researching her PhD in Svalbard, in Britain, mineworkers 
 
11 Andreas Malm, Fossil Capital: The Rise of Steam Power and the Roots of Global Warming, Verso, 
London, 2016, p8. 
 
12 Marcia Bjornerud, Timefulness: How Thinking Like a Geologist Can Save the World, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 2018, p3. 
 
13 The classic work connecting time and industrialism is E. P. Thompson ‘Time, Work-Discipline, and 
Industrial Capitalism’, Past & Present, no. 38, 1967, pp56-97. See also Richard Biernacki’s useful ‘Time 
Cents: The Monetization of the Workday in Comparative Perspective’, in Roger Friedaland and Deirdre 





and their families, heroically struggled to save their jobs by undertaking a year-long 
strike. They didn’t succeed and, in the years following the end of the strike, coal pits 
across the country closed. Communities that had grown over centuries, where workers 
had dedicated themselves since the late eighteenth century to extracting carbon minerals 
that the earth had worked to produce over millions of years (‘between 1150 – 350 
million years’),14 were decimated within a decade. 
To register the geological dimension of the miner’s strike isn’t to demote an 
ideological understanding of the strike that saw it as a fight between the free-market 
fundamentalism of Thatcher and the collective bargaining power of what was once the 
most effective union in Britain; it is, instead, to historically situate that understanding on 
a larger canvas of energy, class and politics, and to connect ideology to the materiality 
of energy. The geological actuality of mining would not, of course, be news to any 
actual miner; it would be inscribed on their bodies, in their lungs, in their physical 
dispositions. The socio-geological aspect of mining was lived as a conflict between 
defending and improving an often deadly form of labour (striving for better wages, 
better working conditions and safety precautions, safeguarding jobs) and ensuring that 
the next generation could escape such lethal conditions.15 While the immediate 
circumstances of the early 1980s required striking to safeguard jobs and refuse pit 
closures, the long-term future being imagined and fought for was not a scene of working 
class bodies enduring underground mineral extraction, generation after generation, for 
eternity.  
There is a political geology to the miners’ strike that helps clarify why the 
Conservative government was able to take on and win what was often a pitched battle 
with the National Union of Mineworkers at that specific moment. If we follow the 
argument made by Timothy Mitchell in Carbon Democracy, we can recognise that 
different energy supplies have very different political affordances. Mitchell positions 
the strike within a history spanning the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: 
 
The widespread use of coal gave workers a new power. The movement of 
unprecedented quantities of fuel along the fixed, narrow channels that led from 
 
14 Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil, Verso, London, 2011, p12. 
 
15 See the final section of Lucy Robinson’s brilliant essay ‘Thoughts on Pride: No Coal Dug’, Open 




the coal mine, along railway tracks and canals, to factories and power stations 
created vulnerable points of passage where a labour strike could paralyse an 
entire energy system. […] In the second half of the twentieth century, 
governments sought to weaken this unusual power that workers had acquired by 
an equally simple engineering project: switching from using coal to using oil and 
gas. […] In Britain, […] the development of nuclear power stations and the oil 
and natural gas fields of the North Sea provided government planners with the 
means to end the country’s dependence on coal for generating electrical power. 
The Conservatives were able to reopen the war against the miners in 1984 with a 
new round of pit closures.16 
 
The social geology of different forms of energy (the flexible rerouting of global oil and 
gas supplies, for instance, compared with the defined routes of coal supplies) connect to 
different class politics (pipeline sabotage and community demonstrations versus large-
scale labour disputes). This history of energy politics is also (as mentioned above) part 
of a much longer history of energy where coal, oil and gas all supersede energy supplied 
by contemporaneous forms of photosynthesis (foods, wood) and wind.  
It is the duality of scales (human time and planetary time) and their 
incommensurability that has recently concerned the historian Dipesh Chakrabarty. In a 
clutch of essays published over the last decade Chakrabarty has been trying to weigh the 
epistemological challenge of climate change for work in the humanities. For a historian 
emerging out of the debates around Subaltern Studies and postcolonialism (and as 
someone who took a leading role in those debates) climate change doesn’t simply trump 
his other concerns. What emerges in Chakrabarty’s writing is the collapse of a 
distinction that would separate human history from natural history, and the concomitant 
‘challenge of having to think of human agency over multiple and incommensurable 
scales at once’.17 But this sense of multiple and incommensurable scales requires an 
account that can be sensitive to the varied capacities of carbon extraction. For instance, 
it would mean recognising that human freedoms were won for ‘anthropological’ or 
 
16 Mitchell, Carbon Democracy, pp. 236-7. Mitchell points out that the strike while severely wounding 
the NUM didn’t kill it; the fatal blow was dealt by MI5 with their false allegations that the NUM leaders 
had misappropriated funds from Libya. 
 
17 Dipesh Chakrabarty, The Crises of Civilization: Exploring Global and Planetary Histories, New Delhi: 




social humans on the basis of fossil fuels, while this extraction and consumption made 
us geological agents bent on designing our own demise. Historically, then, the use of 
fossil fuels is never a straightforwardly good or bad practice but is one with 
incommensurable effects. Chakrabarty, writes that:   
 
The Anthropocene may stand for all the climate problems we face today 
collectively, but it is impossible for me, as a historian of human affairs, not to 
notice that this period of so-called great acceleration is also the period of great 
decolonization in countries that had been dominated by European imperial 
powers and that made a move towards modernization (the damming of rivers, 
for instance) over the ensuing decades and, with the globalization of the last 
twenty years, towards a certain degree of democratization of consumption as 
well. I cannot ignore the fact that “the great acceleration” included the 
production and consumption of consumer durables – such as the refrigerator and 
the washing machine – in Western households that were touted as 
“emancipatory” for women. Nor can I forget the pride with which today the 
most ordinary and poor Indian citizen possesses his or her own smart phone or 
cheap substitute. The lurch into the Anthropocene has also been globally the 
story of some long-anticipated social justice, at least in the sphere of 
consumption.18 
 
For Chakrabarty, as for scholars working in the sphere of what is being called the 
‘energy humanities’, our energy futures, if they aim to have any social justice, will have 
to negotiate the need to mitigate planetary warming while redressing massive energy 
inequalities.19 Wrapped up in the million and millions of years of energy fossilisation 
are capacities for freedom which if distributed with the task of combining justice with 
the global lessening of fossil fuel consumption, would mean that over-developed 
countries particularly would need to completely recalibrate their energy ecology. 
 
18 Dipesh Chakrabarty, ‘Climate and Capital: On Conjoined Histories’, Critical Inquiry, 41, 1, 2014, p15. 
 
19 See, for instance, the introduction to Imre Szeman, On Petrocultures: Globalization, Culture, and 
Energy, Morgantown: West Virginia University Press, 2019. For an overview of the ‘energy humanities’, 
see Imre Szeman and Dominic Boyer, eds Energy Humanities: An Anthology, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 




What is of particular interest to me here, is that Chakrabarty uses the term 
‘disjuncture’ and ‘disjunctive’ to describe the challenges that the historical imagination 
faces in the wake of dual forces of postcolonial globalisation and global warming: 
 
If critical commentary on globalization focuses on issues of anthropological 
difference, the scientific literature on global warming thinks of humans as 
constitutively one – a species, a collectivity whose commitment to fossil-fuel 
based, energy-consuming civilization is now a threat to that civilization itself. 
These views of the human do not supersede one another. One cannot put them 
along a continuum of progress. No one view is rendered invalid by the presence 
of others. They are simply disjunctive. Any effort to contemplate the human 
condition today – after colonialism, globalization, and global warming – on 
political and ethical registers encounters the necessity of thinking disjunctively 
about the human, through moves that in their simultaneity appear 
contradictory.20  
 
For Chakrabarty, then, the duality of a species perspective (humankind as a distinct, 
energy hungry species) and an anthropological purview (where humankind is endless 
differentiated by class, age, gender, sexuality, nationality, religion, and so on) is 
fundamentally irreconcilable. It will result in a disjuncture rather than a conjuncture 
(from the perspective of analysis). What, then, follows from such a position? How do 
we fashion a human science that is attentive to both the level of natural history and 
human history?   
 
DISJUNCTURAL AND CONJUNCTURAL CONSTELLATIONS 
 
In his useful introduction to a previous issue of New Formations, a double issue that 
was also dedicated to a discussion of the role of conjunctural analysis, Jeremy Gilbert 
explains how a conjuncture ‘is composed of specific configurations of emotion, 
attachment and trauma as much as economic and institutional relationships’, he also 
stresses that a ‘conjunctural analysis is never a straightforward exercise in periodisation, 
 




it is always concerned with the identification of continuities and discontinuities on 
multiple scales’.21 For Gilbert, conjunctural analysis characterises the work of Cultural 
Studies when it most firmly wedded to a political sociology eager to search out current 
opportunities for socialist advances and most acutely aware of present dangers. In this 
light, Cultural Studies as a form of conjunctural analysis is charged with the task of 
strategic mapping, with the mission of providing a critical account of the social totality. 
As Gilbert (and Lawrence Grossberg in the same issue) make clear: while conjunctures 
are real relations of power, they don’t simply exist out there in the world; they are partly 
the result of the interests and judgements of the analyst. It is the analysts’ evaluative 
acumen, their synthesizing abilities (which also includes their sweep of historical 
knowledge and the scope of their cultural references) that are going to profoundly affect 
(and effect) the resultant conjunctural description. 
This is important work and difficult to achieve convincingly. But its general 
impossibility (as a project of mapping the totality) is also worth registering. Althusser’s 
sense of the conjuncture as a map of interlacing and sometimes interlocking, relatively 
autonomous spheres already suggests a totalising project that could defeat even the most 
capacious polymath. If we add to this Chakrabarty’s insistence on the irreconcilable but 
deeply entangled combination of natural history and human history, what then becomes 
of the project of conjunctural analysis? We could return, as is often useful, to the 
example of Walter Benjamin, who similarly refused the division between natural and 
human history, but who’s ambitious mapping of culture achieves some of the same 
work as conjunctural analysis.22 Benjamin worked, not from an idea of the conjunctural, 
but from the more modest (and surreal) sense of the explosive constellation. A 
constellation, for Benjamin, was connected to his method of montage, which wasn’t 
simply an artistic technique designed to conjure up unnerving juxtapositions but was the 
living condition of existing within a complexly layered world of modernising impulses 
that were characterised by amnesia, by unfulfilled promises, and unrealised dreams, and 
archaic returns that punctured any claim for progressive social civility. Constellatory 
thinking in Benjamin wasn’t only a practice of drawing out connections between and 
 
21 Jeremy Gilbert, ‘This Conjuncture: For Stuart Hall’ New Formations, 96/97, 2019, pp13-14. 
 
22 Benjamin’s most methodological writing is found in ‘Convolute N: On the Theory of Knowledge, 





across phenomena, it could also be a practice of recognising the multiplicity of times 
within a single item. In his short account of Marcel Proust’s writing, Benjamin claims 
that at the heart of Proust’s world is ‘the universe of convolution [of intertwining]’: of 
multiple times threaded into a single thing or scene. For Benjamin, Proust’s work ‘has 
brought off the tremendous feat of letting the whole world age by a lifetime in an 
instant. But this very concentration in which things that normally just fade and slumber 
consume themselves in a flash is called rejuvenation’.23 In ‘convoluted time’, eternities, 
epochs, and instances, cluster, clash and dissolve in the materiality of life.24  
A recent example of what a constellatory approach to culture studies might 
entail, is given in Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing’s The Mushroom at the End of the World, 
with its hauntingly ambivalent subtitle: On the Possibility of Life in Capitalist Ruins. 
Tsing’s book starts out with a particularly pungent mushroom – the matsutake 
mushroom – growing amongst the forests of Oregon’s Cascade Mountains, foraged by 
refugees from Laos and Cambodia, and sold for surprisingly large amounts of money in 
Japan. Montage, in this scenario, is not the outcome of the surreal predilections of 
Tsing, but of the violently surreal permutations of history (with its trenchant 
intermingling of natural and human histories). The stories that get told resist becoming 
reducible to ‘findings’, because the accounts of lumber production in the Pacific 
Northwest and its attendant ecologies, the displacements of Mien people by the Vietnam 
war and other ‘upheavals’ (from China through Laos and Cambodia), the fate of 
matsutake in a nuclear age and the taste for the mushroom itself don’t reconcile 
themselves into a coherent picture. The book, in Tsing’s words is ‘a mosaic of open-
ended assemblages of entangled ways of life, with each further opening into a mosaic of 
temporal rhythms and spatial arcs.’25 It doesn’t fully cohere (it isn’t meant to), but it 
does compel. 
 
23 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Image of Proust’ [1929] in Illuminations, Fontana, London, 1982, p211. see 
also Graham MacPhee, ‘Glass Before its Time, Premature Iron: The Unforeseeable Futures of 
Technology in Benjamin’s Arcades Project’, New Formations, 54, 2004, pp74-90. 
 
24 Michel Serres demonstrates a similar understanding of time in his discussions with Bruno Latour, 
Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time, translated by Roxanne Lapidus, University of Michigan 
Press, Ann Arbor, 1995. 
 
25 Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, The Mushroom at the End of the World: On the Possibility of Life in 




I find such montage work deeply attractive. For one thing it begins in amongst 
things (in media res): wherever we are. It begins with the messy, untamed coincidence 
of the materials that we, as researchers, often find but are also quick to dismiss if they 
don’t quite fit. Within a culture that overvalues rigour and easily-digestible findings, it 
asks us to notice what doesn’t quite connect: ‘what if precarity, indeterminacy, and what 
we imagine as trivial are the center of the systematicity we seek?’26 Tsing champions an 
art of noticing, for a project that finds fragile and ephemeral assemblages, that open out 
onto blasted histories. Some of my current work looks at the post-1945 adventure 
playgrounds that emerge on bombsites in cities like London, Bristol and Liverpool, on 
waste-ground in New Towns (like Milton Keynes and Harlow) and in the New Town 
expansion of already established towns (such as Crawley and Peterborough). Sensitised 
by Tsing’s work I am learning to notice more. I was already on the look-out for any 
overlaps between playground and discussions of ‘juvenile delinquency’, but what I am 
starting to see is concurrent but disconnected ideas about ‘re-wilding’ (the reclamation 
of the bombsites by a wild nature) and the sense of childhood re-wilding (against the 
passive obedience of paternalistic and submissive culture). I’m catching sight of a hazy 
three-dimensional Venn diagram: where a new petrol-fuelled wildness is making city 
streets death-traps for the children still playing there, who haven’t yet learnt the lesson 
that automobiles are all too willing to teach; where the deadly fogs of London are 
killing thousands of people in one single December month in 1952; where ‘transitional’ 
land (bombed and yet-to-be rebuilt) is dedicated to saving children from parents and 
adults whose default response would often be ‘no’; where an attempt to open a South 
London adventure playground for disabled Children is resisted because it is perceived as 
ugly and as devaluing house prices. The built environment is a long accumulating 
activity; the policing of families, another. These rhythms are syncopated by the 
explosions of bombs, of wild laughter, of the slow perspicacity of the play workers. And 
across all this is the insistent snap that marshals these energies for the purpose of the 
emerging ‘Real Estate State’.27 One way that some of this vision momentarily 
crystalizes is, perversely, when I refuse the constraints of current framings of the 
‘environment’ and return to the much more unsettled idea of the environment that was 
 
26 Ibid, p20. 
 




current in the 1960s and 1970s, which could include street life, advertising, pollution, 
traffic, schools, parks and media.    
The adventure playgrounds, that emerged in the 1950s belong to a conjuncture – 
the same one that witnessed the emergence of the Welfare State. Indeed, seeing it as 
part of this conjuncture extends our understanding of the Welfare State and finds it in 
these more informal (less State-based) enclaves of amateur play work and of the 
adventure playground movement’s ethos of robust self-governance (‘better a broken 
arm than a broken spirit’).28 To see the adventure playground as part of a disjunctive 
constellation is not to refuse its place within a conjuncture, but it is to notice a different 
sense of history, of how the past and the present might be made to intermingle (a history 
of explosives alongside child psychiatry; the atavism of play alongside the changing 
policies of local authorities). It also suggests that we shouldn’t leave the past alone as 
we get on with the injunction to attend to the ‘bad new things.’ There are unfinished 
stories there that need to speak to us now; there are unspent energies here that should be 
tapped. 
 
THE TIGER’S LEAP INTO THE PAST 
 
Within the rich inheritance of Marxism, time receives some peculiar figurations. In 
Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire, the possibilities for truly liberatory social change are cast 
in an almost impossible light for the historical imagination. For Marx the past needs to 
be sloughed off, once and for all, because the ‘tradition of all the dead generations 
weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living’:  
 
The social revolution of the nineteenth century cannot draw its poetry from the 
past, but only from the future. It cannot begin with itself before it has stripped 
off all superstition in regard to the past. Earlier revolutions required recollections 
of past world history in order to drug themselves concerning their own content. 
In order to arrive at its own content, the revolution of the nineteenth century 
must let the dead bury their dead.29 
 
28 This polemical phrase belongs to Lady Allen of Hurtwood. It is slightly misleading given the amount of 
effort that went into establishing safe practices within the movement. 
 
29 Karl Marx The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 1885, in Marx/Engels: Selected Works in One 




It is, of course, an impossible challenge and one that simultaneously negates and proves 
the strength of historical determinism. The limits and pressures of our world are 
provided by our historical inheritance: to go beyond that requires a leap into the 
unknown. This is Marxism wanting to bet on the liberatory and progressive potential of 
an unknown future. By the time that Benjamin was writing his more Gothic and 
disenchanted Marxism that gamble on the future seemed less amenable: the 
revolutionary zeal of capitalism proved constantly able to ‘let the dead bury their dead’.  
In Convolute N, the methodological engine for his Arcades Project, Walter 
Benjamin writes: ‘overcoming the concept of “progress” and overcoming the concept of 
“period of decline” are two sides of one and the same thing’.30 Is it possible to 
overcome progress and decline? Doesn’t our political energy pulse to these rhythms? As 
Tsing suggests, today while we might be sceptical about ‘progress’ and ‘modernity’ (or 
highly critical of the implied imperialism they convey) such, ‘categories and 
assumptions of improvement are with us everywhere’.31 University life, for instance, is 
threaded through with practices and values of improvement (improving student 
experience, improving feedback, grading, teaching methods, and so on), and many of us 
have had several decades of being involved in, and sometimes also initiating, these 
‘improvements’. Yet simultaneous with this drive to ‘excellence’ we can also feel – in 
both tangible and intangible ways – that things have got ‘worse’, much worse. 
In an essay describing her project of studying global change in the English 
village that she was born in, Vron Ware writes: ‘My way of knowing it was marked by a 
temporality that insisted that an older “way of life” was inexorably coming to an end – 
even if “the end”, already underway when I was born in the 1950s, seemed to have no 
beginning’.32 Ends without beginnings might be a structure of feeling common to 
anyone living under the revolutionary zeal of capitalist modernization, it is certainly a 
common feeling when studying twentieth century cultural history. A sense of entropic 
decay pervades all sorts of discourses to the point where it often seems to be 
 
 
30 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, p460. 
 
31 Tsing, The Mushroom at the End of the World, p20. 
 
32 Vron Ware, ‘Cheap chickens and ethical eggs: the place of an English village in the world’, Writing 
Otherwise: Experiments in Cultural Criticism, edited by Jackie Stacey and Janet Wolff, Manchester 




constitutive of their discursive mood (it is hard to find, for example, any left-leaning 
approach to higher education that isn’t built on a sense of the university in ruins). But if 
a sense of an ending without a beginning is endemic, is the opposite also possible: a 
sense of a beginning without end?   
From the perspective of a Cultural Studies, sensitized to the irreconcilable scales 
of diplomacy and fossil fuels, and the whole gamut in between, the history that we call 
modernity is one explosive and unending interregnum. In energy terms there was never 
a complete global move from wood, wind, and food to coal, gas and oil. On this massive 
scale of energy history transitions are never complete. In Gramsci’s famous 
formulation: ‘The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new 
cannon be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear’.33 Of 
course Gramsci is referring to specific transitions in the authority of dominant classes 
and hegemonic blocs. But from the perspective of the history of colonialism and its 
aftermath, alongside the geological agency of the human species, morbid symptoms 
might be another name for Benjamin’s insistence that ‘there is no document of culture 
which is not at the same time a document of barbarism’.34 At the same time there may 
well be forms of planetary stewardship from the past that need to be restored not as an 
attempt to recreate ‘the good old days’, but as practices much more attuned to care, and 
much less amenable to exhaustive forms of extraction.  
If we follow Tsing and Benjamin and refuse the lure of progress and decline can 
we still rescue a sense of the unfinished (and unfinishable) task of a disjunctural and 
conjunctural analysis. To get a sense of the possibilities here it is worth returning, 
finally, to the work of Stuart Hall. After all it might be that there is always a disjunctive 
kernel within the conjunctural shell of the social. This is Stuart Hall describing a 
conjunctural shift to the sociologist Les Back:   
 
What I thought was that Thatcherism was really the end of one configuration – 
the post-war settlement – and the beginning of something else. […] But about 
my sense of that break, people do ask me, ‘How do you know of that?’ I can’t 
 
33 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, New York: International Publishers, 1971, 
p276. The phrase is the title of a recent work of conjunctural analysis: Nancy Fraser, The Old is Dying 
and the New Cannot be Born, London: Verso, 2019. 
 





tell them that. It’s not a precise methodology; it’s not something which I apply 
outside to it. It’s interpretive and historical. I have to feel the kind of 
accumulation of different things coming together to make a new moment, and 
think, this is a different rhythm. We’ve lived with one configuration and this is 
another one.35 
 
Any methodological procedures that we could extract from this short description would 
need to attuned to the words ‘feel’, ‘accumulation’, ‘things’, and ‘rhythm’, as well as to 
the recognition that historical interpretation (from Hall’s perspective) is wrought from 
experience and the distillation of observations rather than applied from the outside as 
though the social world were a text that needed decoding. These are ordinary terms 
freighted with methodological significance and pointing as much to the sensorial as to 
the ideational, suggesting both a sensitivity to changes at the level of social aesthetics 
and to registers of value, compassion, and expenditure. To be aware of the disjunctural 
in the heart of the conjunctural would require not simply an attention to dominant 
political rhetoric, but to direction and flows of energy, to changes in taste, to 
distributions of time, to orchestrations of the senses.    
 It is this attentiveness to shifts in mood, to alterations in flows and direction of 
energy, that is key to the sort of disjunctive constellations and ‘felt’ conjunctural 
analysis that I think can be attentive to the multiple challenges and emergencies of 
today. The outcome of a conjunctural analysis seems like a writer getting on top of 
things: Stuart Hall’s description of how a conjunctural feeling emerges suggests that it 
starts when a writer gets in amongst things.36 Hall recognises and feels new, different 
rhythms as the 1970s slip into the 80s. The changing rhythms that Hall notices in the 
1980s are relevant to my story of adventure playgrounds. Many of the adventure 
playgrounds that were operating at the end of the 1970s were closed down in the 1980s 
as an initiative that had invested in people changed to an attitude that was more 
accommodating to real estate priorities. A disjunctive constellation could start here: 
 
35 Stuart Hall and Les Back, ‘In Conversation: At home and Not at Home’, Cultural Studies Vol. 23, No. 
4, 2009, p665. 
 
36 I’m borrowing this formulation from Steven Connor’s project of cultural phenomenology: ‘whatever 
interpreting and explication cultural phenomenology managed to pull off would be achieved by the 
manner in which it got amid a given subject or problem, not by the degree to which it got on top of it’. 




with the closing down of an adventure playground, with adolescents jettisoned from 
what were potentially sanctuary spaces. It could also connect to much larger stories of 
wood and petrol, of spaces dedicated to amateur carpentry becoming spaces that were 
determined by petroleum driven transport. And these stories cross the Atlantic, with 
tales of car manufacturing, of different ideas of freedom (the freedom of the 
playground, the freedom of private vehicles). Such a disjunctive constellation would be 
open to Paul Gilroy’s  
 
… plea to consider the specific forms of freedom promoted and withheld where 
car culture has shaped a racialised and segregated polity. The outcome 
represents a diminution of citizenship, and it is associated with a privatisation 
that confiscates the possibility of collective experience, synchronised suffering, 
and acting in concert. In these circumstances, the automobile becomes the 
instrument of segregation and privatisation, not an aid to their overcoming.37 
 
Our urban spaces are fashioned out of petrol and diesel fumes that are millions of years 
old; out of the long histories of freedoms ‘promoted and withheld’; out of the teeming 
affects that course through our city streets in the patterns of fear and excitement, of 
anxiety and ease.  
 
CODA: LIVING ON BORROWED TIME 
 
Marx says that revolutions are the 
locomotive of world history. But perhaps it 
is quite otherwise. Perhaps revolutions are 
an attempt by the passengers on this train – 
namely, the human race – to activate the 
emergency brake.38  
 
 
37 Paul Gilroy, Darker than Blue: On the Moral Economies of Black Atlantic Culture, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2010, p22. 
 
38 Walter Benjamin, ‘Paralipomena to “On the Concept of History”’ (1940), in Walter Benjamin selected 




We are living at a time of multiple and competing emergencies. How are we going to 
find the imaginative and practical resources to creatively and critically respond to a 
world simultaneously experiencing the developments of a climate catastrophe; the rise 
of far-right populism; widespread and intransigent forms of misogyny, racism, 
homophobia and transphobia; a global reconfiguring of imperial powers and class 
dynamics; and an electronic ecology that endlessly colonises our world, and our sense 
of worldliness? Each of our current emergencies has a rhythm and a political 
‘brightness’ about it that simultaneously illuminates and casts shadows, synchronises 
and generates temporal dissonance: what sort of concerns can we muster about the 
environment when faced with the immediate urgency of racist violence; what becomes 
newly visible about sexism in the apocalyptic light of global warming? While a 
conjunctural approach to historical time is charged with the goal of being able to 
connect the temporalities of these emergencies into some form of comprehensible 
orchestration, a disjunctural approach suspends the satisfaction of comprehension in the 
name of something whose potential remains untested. 
To put the issue as directly as possible: how do we articulate and analyse the 
condition of living across multiple rates of change? And to put the matter in its current, 
disquieting light: how do we articulate multiple rates of change as a series of connected 
and disconnected emergencies? This is the issue that a conjunctural approach to culture 
and society at once both highlights and promises to address. It is both an age-old 
question and one that is always historically sensitive, constantly finding in the 
specificity of the historical, new orchestrations of speeds, rhythms and durations. 
Sometimes manners change faster than plumbing; sometimes it is the other way around. 
The idea of the conjunctural suggests a snapshot of a complex arrangement of rates of 
change seen from the perspective of something like eternity. The conjunctural is 
constitutionally connected to the disjunctive and highlights the way that a moment in 
time is always a mixture of scales and durations: the vast and the infinitesimal and the 
various points in between. We simultaneously live on a planet, on a continent, in a 
country, in a series of rooms. We live from second to second, animated by memory and 
desire, we live a specific stage of the life course (adolescence, senescence, etc.), we live 
an epoch, we live the history of our species-being, and we live a planetary history that 
has only hosted humankind for a tiny period of its existence. Recognising our 
dependency on fossil fuels for our freedoms and our sense of modernity should be the 
recognition that we have been living quite literally on borrowed time. 
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This essay set out with a modest aim of wanting to increase the imaginative 
capacities of Cultural Studies in the direction of a different form of timefulness for 
thinking about conjunctures and disjunctures. To be clear: there is no claim here that 
such timefulness will result in better custodianship of the earth. Nor is the aim to 
critique the forms of conjunctural analysis that Cultural Studies has rightly prided itself 
in performing. In the face of so many emergencies the space for experimentation might 
be shrinking. In placing a wager on our long-term survival, I want to reserve a space for 
the wild scales of the disjunctural.  
 
Thanks to Jeremy Gilbert and Scott McCracken for providing useful feedback.  
